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Global airline alliances provide connectivity based on codesharing agreements between mem-
ber airlines. An alliance member exit leads to the deletion of routes (if not operated by other 
members) which affects network connectivity. The paper measures the vulnerability of the 
codesharing network (CN) of Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam, respectively, by apply-
ing the theory of complex networks. A normalized CN vulnerability metric is proposed. Using 
airline schedules data, a ranking of member airlines according to their share in the overall CN 
vulnerability is derived. The results for CNs are compared with the ones for the respective 
total network (TN) that includes routes with and without codesharing. The findings show that 
oneworld is the most vulnerable global airline alliance, SkyTeam ranks second followed by 
Star Alliance. The proposed graph theory approach might become a building block for a more 
comprehensive measurement of real world airline networks.   
 
 




The restructuring of airline activities into branded global alliances has been one of the major 
traits of this industry since Star Alliance was founded in 1997, followed by the formation of 
oneworld in 1999 and SkyTeam in 2000. Global alliances provide network connectivity based 
on codesharing agreements between member airlines. Codesharing is an interline partnership 
where one carrier sell tickets by placing its designator code on another carrier's flights. The 
airline selling seats is referred to as the marketing carrier and the airline providing the flight is 
referred to as the operating carrier. While codesharing dates back to the 1960s, it only became 
common in the early 1990s. The launch of the modern era of global airline alliances began 
with the large-scale codesharing agreement between Northwest Airlines and KLM in 1989. 
The aim is that the route network of a global alliance appears to be an extension of each part-
ner’s network. Codesharing in combination with coordinated flight schedules allows the pro-
vision of continuous services for passengers connecting between airlines. However, alliance 
members may take advantage of the route networks of partner airlines even without codeshar-
ing, e.g. due to interline agreements between individual airlines that cover connecting flights. 
A codeshare agreement usually requires an interline agreement. 
 
At present, Star Alliance has 28 member airlines, SkyTeam 20, and oneworld 14 (cf. Appen-
dix A) which together have a share of around 60% in worldwide air traffic. Extensive 
codesharing among global alliances allows airlines to offer routes without operating them 
which is cost-efficient. Avoiding overlapping operations also implies less competition. The 
drawback is a dependency on partner airlines. A member exit leads to the deletion of routes (if 
not operated by other alliance members) which affects network connectivity. In 2014, US 
Airways and TAM left Star Alliance after these two carriers merged with airlines from one-
world. oneworld on its part lost Malév after the financial collapse of this former Hungarian 
flag carrier in 2012. In early 2016, Qatar Airways threatened to withdraw from oneworld 
should fellow member American Airlines continue to push the US government to restrict 
market access for the Gulf carriers. An exit of partner airlines has negative consequences for 
global alliances, e.g. in the form of sunk costs due to alliance-specific investments or the risk 
that former alliance members use confidential information to their competitive advantage. 
Further, it implies a decrease in network coverage. The assessment of the (potential) damage 
to the codesharing network (CN) of global airline alliances is the subject matter of the present 
paper. 
 
Not all member exits have the same impact because some airlines contribute more to the CN 
of a global alliance than others. Therefore, it is an important issue for the managing bodies of 
an alliance how to accurately assess the impact of an exit of a given member airline and simi-
larly, how to develop a CN with appropriate partner selection. This paper studies the CN vul-
nerability of global alliances to member exits. We propose measures that can be instrumental 
in assessing the dependency of an alliance on a member’s route network and can also serve to 
develop a more resilient CN. The results for CNs are compared with the ones for the respec-
tive total network (TN) that includes routes with and without codesharing. 
 
Research on airline alliances and codesharing among airlines includes several studies on the 
effects of airline alliances on traffic volumes and airfares (Oum et al. 1996; Park, 1997; Park 
and Zhang, 1998; Brueckner, 2001; Brueckner et al., 2011; Zou et al., 2011). Kleymann and 
Seristö (2001) analyzed the trade-off between alliance benefits and risks. Douglas and Tan 
(2017) examined whether the formation of global airline alliances resulted in an increase in 
profitability for the founding members. Garg (2016) presented a model based approach to 
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select strategic alliance partners. Different reasons for a company to leave an inter-firm co-
operation are discussed by Sroka and Hittmár (2013). The welfare effects of codesharing 
agreements have been investigated by Hassin and Shy (2004) and, more recently, Adler and 
Hanany (2016).  
 
There is an increasing and extensive literature of transport vulnerability studies. This paper 
measures the (potential) damage for the CNs of global airline alliances caused by member 
exits. Such alliances constitute an intermediate level of air transport networks between indi-
vidual airline networks and the industry network (Lordan et al., 2014a). Mattsson and Jenelius 
(2015) provide an overview of recent research on vulnerability and resilience of transport sys-
tems. While they point out that there is no commonly agreed definition of transport system 
vulnerability, they conceptualize vulnerability as the susceptibility of transport systems to 
infrequent events that can result in considerable network degradations. In the context of the 
present paper, the infrequent event is a member exit having an adverse impact on the CN of a 
global airline alliance. The study of air transport networks includes the topological analysis of 
global (Guimerà and Amaral, 2004; Guimerà et al., 2005) and regional (Bagler, 2008; Zhang 
et al., 2010) route networks. Vulnerability is investigated for global (Lordan et al., 2014b), 
and regional (Chi and Cai, 2004; Du et al. 2016) networks. Lordan et al. (2015) examine the 
robustness of alliance airline route networks based on the assumption of unweighted networks 
only considering operating flights. Hence, the differing economic relevance of a given route 
operated by one member to other alliance members is disregarded. Weights could be based on 
the number of flight frequencies or seat capacities, and also by distinguishing between domes-
tic, continental and intercontinental routes. The consideration of codesharing as an indicator 
of route relevance from the perspective of partner airlines represents a basic weighting 
scheme to enhance the practical meaning of the vulnerability measures. CNs are subsets of the 
respective TNs which consist only of operated routes that have a marketing flight number by 
at least one other carrier belonging to the same alliance. Our paper only looks at codesharing 
between member airlines of the same global alliance. In spite of this, the industry showcases 
other codesharing partnerships. There is codesharing between aligned and non-aligned airlines 
(e.g. Qantas and Emirates) and between carriers belonging to the same holding company (e.g. 
Lufthansa and Eurowings). Codesharing across global alliances is rather unusual. One exam-
ple is Aeroflot and Finnair on the Helsinki-Moscow-route. 
 
In this paper, CN vulnerability of real world networks is analyzed building on the theory of 
complex networks (Estrada, 2011; Estrada and Knight, 2015). More specifically, CN vulnera-
bility is measured using the concept of normalized average edge betweenness (Mishkovski et 
al., 2011). The proposed method to measure CN vulnerability relates to work using a graph 
theory approach to develop strategies to increase the resilience of air traffic networks to dis-
ruptive events, such as extreme weather events, strike action or terrorist threats (Dunn and 
Wilkinson, 2015). It might also be valuable for a more comprehensive study of route net-
works that include other network indicators such as hubness and size (Roucolle et al., 2017).   
 
The proposed methodology provides a normalized measure of the vulnerability of a given CN 
to (potential) member exits. Data comes from the OAG airline schedules database. One result 
of applying this measure is that oneworld is the most vulnerable CN, SkyTeam ranks second 
and Star Alliance is the most robust CN. Further, the paper indicates a positive relation be-
tween network robustness and route overlaps among members of global airline alliances. We 
also rank member airlines according to their contribution to the overall CN vulnerability. Our 
paper shows that the size of a carrier’s scheduled operation is not strictly related to the carri-
er’s importance for the vulnerability of an airline alliance route network. Finally, a compari-
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son with results for TNs as unweighted alliance route networks illustrates the importance of 





A codesharing network (CN) contains airports (nodes) connected by codeshared routes (edg-
es), i.e., two airports are linked if an alliance member is operating flights between them with a 
designator code of another carrier from the same alliance. The proposed metric to assess CN 
vulnerability extends the graph theory concept of average edge betweenness as introduced by 
Boccaletti et al. (2007) for the graph G:   
 
                (1) 
 
where |E| is the number of edges and bl is the edge betweenness of the edge l defined as 
 
                (2) 
 
where nij(l) is the number of geodesics (shortest paths) from node i to node j that contain the 
edge l, and nij is the total number of shortest paths between i and j. If N represent the number 
of nodes of a network, then the b(G) values for a complete graph and a path graph are 
 
  and       (3) 
 
and, hence, b(Gcomplete) ≤ b(G) ≤ b(Gpath). G is more robust than G', if b(G) < b(G'). The nor-
malized average edge betweenness of a network is defined as (Mishkovski et al., 2011) 
 
      (4) 
 
where bnor(G) ranges from 0 (i.e., the most robust network) to 1 (i.e., the most vulnerable net-
work). Thus, bnor(G) is a normalized measure of network vulnerability. The contribution of a 
member airline to the overall vulnerability of a CN can then be calculated as the relative dif-
ference of the normalized average edge betweenness, that is 
 
        (5) 
 
where G' is the graph obtained from G (i.e., the entire CN) after removing the edges of the 
exiting member airline which are not operated by any other member. A positive value of 
Dmember implies that the CN becomes more vulnerable. The higher the value of Dmember the 
more negatively affected is the CN by the exit of the respective airline. A negative value of 
Dmember would mean that a member exit is actually decreasing the CN vulnerability, i.e., the 





The vulnerability of the three global alliances is analyzed using OAG airline schedules data 
for the week ending September 11, 2016. In Figure 1 we rank member airlines of Star Alli-
ance, SkyTeam and oneworld based on their contribution to the codesharing network (CN) of 
the respective alliance, i.e., according to their Dmember value. ALL (with value 0) refers to the 
entire CN without any exit.  
 
As Dmember is calculated with the normalized average edge betweenness bnor(G) of a specific 
alliance, this metric measures the relative impact on network vulnerability caused by the re-
moval of an airline from this alliance. As the value of bnor(G) can vary between alliances, the 
absolute impact on network vulnerability can be quite different across alliances for similar 
values of Dmember. Taking this into account, the relative impact of American Airlines (AA) on 
oneworld’s CN is comparatively larger than the one of United Airlines (UA) on Star Alliance 
and Delta Airlines (DL) on SkyTeam. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the length of the bars 
representing UA, DL, and AA in relation to the bars of the other carriers of Star Alliance, 
SkyTeam, and oneworld, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Vulnerability of CNs of global airline alliances to member exits ranked by Dmember. 
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Table 1 provides the values of the average edge betweenness b(G'), the normalized average 
edge betweenness bnor(G'), and relative difference of the normalized average edge between-
ness Dmember for each member airline. For ALL, b(G') and bnor(G') equal b(G) and bnor(G), 
respectively, as ALL stands for the CN without any member removal. The bnor(G) value ALL 
= 0.0724 for oneworld’s entire CN is larger than the respective values for SkyTeam and Star 
Alliance which makes it the most vulnerable among the three CNs. While the values of Dmem-
ber and bnor(G') represent a one-to-one mapping, i.e., a higher (lower) value of Dmember is strictly 
related to a higher (lower) value of  bnor(G'), this is not the case for the relation between Dmem-
ber and b(G'). For example, the bnor(G') of the Star Alliance members United Airlines (UA) and 
Air China (CA) are 0.00508 and 0.00464, respectively, while the values for b(G') have a re-
verse order (277.7 and 312.6). The average edge betweenness does not account for the change 
in the number of airport nodes of a CN resulting from a member exit. This is the reason why 
Dmember is computed as the relative difference of the normalized average edge betweenness of 
a CN with and without a given member airline. 
Table 1. Vulnerability measures of CNs ranked by Dmember. 
Star 
Alliance b(G’) bnor(G’) Dmember SkyTeam b(G’) bnor(G’) Dmember oneworld b(G’) bnor(G’) Dmember 
UA 277.7 0.00508 0.403 DL 310.2 0.00696 0.575 AA 301.0 0.01416 0.956 
CA 312.6 0.00464 0.282 CZ 390.1 0.00552 0.249 BA 315.0 0.00928 0.282 
LH 328.8 0.00430 0.186 KL 377.3 0.00524 0.186 IB 284.9 0.00866 0.196 
ZH 323.1 0.00429 0.183 AF 373.8 0.00504 0.140 JL 299.1 0.00788 0.088 
AC 325.9 0.00410 0.132 MU 387.2 0.00486 0.100 AB 338.6 0.00780 0.078 
NH 326.9 0.00393 0.084 MF 424.6 0.00483 0.093 LA 290.1 0.00774 0.069 
TK 314.1 0.00380 0.047 AZ 399.6 0.00467 0.058 QR 298.0 0.00769 0.062 
SQ 322.7 0.00376 0.038 KE 403.2 0.00462 0.047 AY 327.0 0.00765 0.057 
SK 316.5 0.00374 0.032 AM 370.4 0.00457 0.034 QF 330.5 0.00759 0.048 
LX 340.8 0.00373 0.029 SU 372.5 0.00454 0.028 RJ 336.4 0.00743 0.026 
OS 333.4 0.00373 0.029 UX 396.8 0.00451 0.021 CX 336.0 0.00742 0.025 
SN 330.8 0.00372 0.026 CI 397.1 0.00449 0.017 MH 330.0 0.00740 0.022 
NZ 315.5 0.00372 0.026 OK 401.1 0.00449 0.016 UL 337.0 0.00738 0.020 
OZ 329.4 0.00371 0.025 KQ 385.9 0.00449 0.016 S7 292.3 0.00738 0.020 
TP 334.3 0.00371 0.023 VN 403.0 0.00448 0.015 ALL 330.4 0.00724 0 
ET 323.0 0.00370 0.022 GA 396.3 0.00448 0.014 
   
  
AV 324.2 0.00369 0.019 AR 394.3 0.00446 0.009       
A3 331.7 0.00369 0.018 SV 400.5 0.00446 0.009       
TG 330.6 0.00369 0.017 RO 391.8 0.00444 0.006       
CM 321.3 0.00368 0.016 ME 401.9 0.00443 0.004       
OU 332.8 0.00368 0.016 ALL 400.3 0.00442 0       
AI 331.3 0.00367 0.014             
MS 330.1 0.00367 0.013             
LO 335.8 0.00366 0.011             
BR 334.0 0.00366 0.011             
JP 331.5 0.00366 0.009             
SA 328.5 0.00365 0.008             
O6 322.1 0.00364 0.005             
ALL 332.2 0.00362 0                 
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CNs contain only routes operated by one member airline of a global airline alliance network 
that also has codesharing (i.e. a marketing flight number) by at least another carrier from the 
respective alliance. Codesharing is an indicator for relevance of a given alliance route. This 
can also be seen as a basic weighting scheme assigning the weight “1” to all codeshared 
routes and “0” to all non-codeshared routes. The results for CNs are now related to the respec-
tive total network (TN) that includes routes with and without codesharing.  
 
Table 2 provides the values for nodes N, edges E, shared nodes SN, and shared edges SE of 
each airline belonging to one of the three TNs. SN and SE stand for the number of airport and 
route duplicates in a TN with other member airlines out of the total alliance nodes and edges. 
All non-shared nodes and edges of an airline, i.e., all airports and routes not operated by any 
other alliance member, disappear from the TN if this airline leaves the alliance. For ALL, SN 
and SE stand for all duplicates among its members out of the total alliance nodes and edges. 
39.0% of all 1,207 weekly scheduled airports operated by Star Alliance in September 2016 
are duplicates, 33.4% out of 1,058 at SkyTeam and only 27.3% out of 942 at oneworld. one-
world has the lowest SE percentage with 2.6%, while SE percentages for Star Alliance and 
SkyTeam are 5.8% and 9.0%, respectively. SN and SE for ALL are the lowest for oneworld 
which are network properties that contribute to the higher vulnerability of oneworld measured 
by Dmember in comparison to the more robust alliance networks. Similarly, the total TN edge-
to-node ratio of oneworld is 2.9 (2,734 edges divided by 942 nodes) which is considerably 
below the ratio of 3.7 and 3.6 for the two other global airline alliances.  
Table 2. Member properties of TNs ranked by Dmember (N: Nodes; E: Edges; SN: Shared nodes; SE: Shared edges). 
Star 
Alliance N E SN % SE % SkyTeam N E SN % SE % oneworld N E SN % SE % 
UA 337 845 43.6 5.4 DL 328 833 31.4 2.4 AA 340 932 29.1 2.8 
TK 277 423 71.1 4.0 CZ 196 646 79.6 34.1 AB 103 281 75.7 1.1 
CA 180 405 68.9 17.3 MU 206 633 74.8 31.1 BA 213 267 83.6 8.2 
AC 189 327 66.1 6.4 SU 143 235 59.4 5.5 QR 150 151 74.7 3.3 
LH 200 297 94.0 17.2 AF 165 194 79.4 10.8 IB 125 174 81.6 9.8 
ZH 75 236 86.7 16.1 KL 146 153 84.9 15.7 LA 134 271 26.9 7.7 
SK 103 193 72.8 10.4 SV 80 185 58.8 3.8 AY 94 94 73.4 3.2 
NH 95 187 65.3 14.4 MF 76 211 97.4 44.5 JL 74 124 47.3 8.9 
A3 82 140 95.1 12.1 AZ 91 129 78.0 10.9 S7 100 134 34.0 0.7 
AI 87 163 50.6 6.7 KE 114 140 92.1 27.9 QF 79 135 31.6 6.7 
OS 112 123 86.6 12.2 AM 84 128 56.0 3.1 CX 56 62 96.4 21.0 
LX 99 119 96.0 16.8 VN 51 101 70.6 10.9 MH 69 103 50.7 4.9 
AV 83 149 65.1 9.4 UX 53 92 71.7 4.3 RJ 49 50 93.9 10.0 
ET 100 120 79.0 13.3 CI 68 84 92.6 23.8 UL 29 29 93.1 13.8 
SN 92 98 89.1 13.3 KQ 54 74 64.8 9.5 ALL 942 2,734 27.3 2.6 
TP 81 93 81.5 8.6 OK 47 51 87.2 13.7   
   
  
OZ 85 96 85.9 20.8 RO 40 45 80.0 8.9        
CM 74 87 87.8 16.1 GA 79 144 25.3 8.3        
MS 68 80 89.7 10.0 ME 32 33 84.4 12.1        
SA 72 105 50.0 6.7 AR 59 109 30.5 3.7        
LO 63 63 96.8 15.9 ALL 1,058 3,839 33.4 9.0        
BR 52 59 96.2 16.9             
TG 61 64 95.1 25.0             
SQ 60 61 98.3 32.8             
OU 35 56 94.3 19.6             
JP 37 46 91.9 8.7             
NZ 50 85 40.0 3.5             
O6 24 54 37.5 0.0             
ALL 1,207 4,507 39.0 5.8                     
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The exit of the respective US member airline would have the biggest impact on the TN of all 
three alliances, because many routes offered by the US carriers are not operated by any other 
alliance member. For example, Delta Air Lines (DL) only operates SE=2.4% overlapping 
routes and a relatively small percentage SN=31.4% of airport duplicates with other member 
airlines from SkyTeam. Clearly, this is due to the large domestic network offered by the US 
carriers.  
 
Codesharing enhances the commercial significance of airports and scheduled routes in global 
airline alliance networks. Table 3 allows for a comparison of member properties between CNs 
and TNs. It contains the rank difference of each carrier’s contribution to the network vulnera-
bility measured by Dmember between the respective TN and CN, a positive (negative) value for 
the difference TN minus CN indicating that a carrier’s contribution is higher (lower) for CN 
than TN. Table 3 also shows the number of nodes N and edges E linked with codesharing for 
each carrier and for ALL as well as the node and edge ratio between CN and TN. 
Table 3. Member properties of CNs ranked by Dmember                                                                                                                                                            















N E CNN         % 







N E CNN % 
CNE 
% 
UA 0 233 594 69.1 70.3 DL 0 263 667 80.2 80.1 AA 0 223 477 65.6 51.2 
CA 1 143 333 79.4 82.2 CZ 0 128 351 65.3 54.3 BA 1 153 180 71.8 67.4 
LH 2 170 248 85.0 83.5 KL 3 135 139 92.5 90.8 IB 2 103 113 82.4 64.9 
ZH 2 72 216 96.0 91.5 AF 1 149 167 90.3 86.1 JL 4 59 74 79.7 59.7 
AC -1 117 192 61.9 58.7 MU -2 103 233 50.0 36.8 AB -3 40 69 38.8 24.6 
NH 2 68 106 71.6 56.7 MF 2 66 187 86.8 88.6 LA 0 68 93 50.7 34.3 
TK -5 88 89 31.8 21.0 AZ 2 71 89 78.0 69.0 QR -3 54 53 36.0 35.1 
SQ 16 50 51 83.3 83.6 KE 2 70 74 61.4 52.9 AY -1 55 55 58.5 58.5 
SK -2 54 81 52.4 42.0 AM 2 68 87 81.0 68.0 QF 1 27 44 34.2 32.6 
LX 2 62 73 62.6 61.3 SU -6 60 67 42.0 28.5 RJ 3 19 19 38.8 38.0 
OS 0 64 69 57.1 56.1 UX 2 28 30 52.8 32.6 CX 0 34 37 60.7 59.7 
SN 3 68 73 73.9 74.5 CI 2 32 34 47.1 40.5 MH 0 26 26 37.7 25.2 
NZ 14 42 64 84.0 75.3 OK 3 32 32 68.1 62.7 UL 1 10 9 34.5 31.0 
OZ 3 51 55 60.0 57.3 KQ 1 38 52 70.4 70.3 S7 -5 38 37 38.0 27.6 
TP 1 28 32 34.6 34.4 VN -3 19 30 37.3 29.7 ALL 0 522 1,234 55.4 45.1 
ET -2 52 58 52.0 48.3 GA 2 23 31 29.1 21.5    
   
  
AV -4 44 57 53.0 38.3 AR 3 16 22 27.1 20.2         
A3 -9 28 33 34.1 23.6 SV -11 12 16 15.0 8.6         
TG 4 40 40 65.6 62.5 RO -2 22 23 55.0 51.1         
CM -2 35 36 47.3 41.4 ME -1 8 7 25.0 21.2         
OU 4 21 33 60.0 58.9 ALL 0 736 2,086 69.6 54.3         
AI -12 24 35 27.6 21.5               
MS -4 29 29 42.6 36.3               
LO -3 29 28 46.0 44.4               
BR -3 22 24 42.3 40.7               
JP 0 18 20 48.6 43.5               
SA -7 20 20 27.8 19.0               
O6 0 16 17 66.7 31.5               
ALL 0 740 2,508 61.3 55.6                      
 
Table 3 contains some pronounced rank differences between CN and TN. In the Star Alliance 
network, notable upward movers are Singapore Airline (SQ) and Air New Zealand (NZ). In 
contrast, Turkish Airlines (TK), South African Airways (SA), Aegean Airlines (A3), and Air 
India (AI) lose ranks. Considering the smaller total number of 20 member airlines of Skyteam 
in comparison to the 28 members of Star Alliance, the rank losses of Aeroflot (SU) and in 
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particular Saudi Arabian Airlines (SV) are striking. In the oneworld network, S7 Airlines (S7) 
forfeits many ranks. The mentioned airlines with rank losses tend to be more recent acces-
sions to the respective alliances.  
 
The exclusion of non-codeshared routes brings down the size of CNs compared to TNs. This 
also holds for the number of airports as some are served without codesharing. The ALL val-
ues for CNN and CNE of oneworld are considerably below the respective values of the other 
two alliances. The different percentages of codeshared airports and routes among global air-
line alliances essentially result from varying member strategies on virtual network extension 
by codesharing. Within Star Alliance, CNN and CNE values of three carriers exceed 80%, i.e. 
more than 4 out of 5 airports and routes operated have at least one codesharing arrangement. 
Besides Lufthansa (LH) and Singapore Airlines (SQ), Shenzhen Airlines (SZ) is also highly 
active in promoting their operations with codesharing. Actually, SZ features the highest over-
all CN to TN ratios (CNN = 96.0%, CNE = 91.5%). Skyteam has the largest gap between the 
most and the least active operating carrier allowing for codesharing with at least one other 
alliance partner; KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines (KL) with CNN = 92.5% and CNE = 90.8 in con-





The normalized average edge betweenness for the CN of oneworld is larger than the respec-
tive ALL-values for SkyTeam and Star Alliance. Hence, oneworld’s CN is more vulnerable to 
member exits than the other two CNs. This is reflected by the average Dmember values (Star 
Alliance 0.061, SkyTeam 0.082, and 0.139 for oneworld) and also the maximum Dmember val-
ues (Star Alliance 0.403, SkyTeam 0.575, and 0.956 for oneworld). Intuitively, one might 
ascribe this difference in vulnerability to the different percentages of shared nodes SN among 
all nodes. For TN, 39.0% of all 1,207 weekly scheduled airports operated by Star Alliance in 
September 2016 are duplicates, 33.4% out of 1,058 at SkyTeam and only 27.3% out of 942 at 
oneworld (see Table 2). This suggests higher average Dmember values for oneworld. Likewise, 
low percentages of shared edges SE increase Dmember indicating higher vulnerability. oneworld 
has the lowest SE percentage with 2.6%, while SE percentages for Star Alliance and SkyTeam 
are 5.8% and 9.0% respectively. 
 
The total number of airports and routes offered by a member airline also affects its share in 
the network vulnerability. Alliance members operating larger networks with many routes and 
airports tend to also have higher Dmember values which is intuitively plausible. However, there 
is no one-to-one relation between the total number of nodes or edges and Dmember values. Ta-
ble 3 shows the rank difference of each carrier as an alliance member between the respective 
CN and TN. A positive (negative) value of the difference TN minus CN indicates that a carri-
er’s contribution to network vulnerability is higher (lower) for CN than for TN. For example, 
Rank ∆ = 3 for Air Berlin (AB) indicates that AB is lesser important for the vulnerability of 
oneworld’s CN than TN. Looking at the TN only might lead to wrong conclusions about the 
potential impact of an exit of a carrier like AB on the airline grouping. AB operates many 
routes that seem to have little commercial relevance for other oneworld members as three out 
of four routes operated by AB are without codesharing. Hence, the exit of AB which actually 
ceased operations on October 28, 2017 after filing for bankruptcy is less relevant for oneworld 
considering codesharing routes instead of operated routes. 
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For all three alliances the exit of the US member airline (UA, DL, or AA) would have the 
biggest impact on the TN and the CN. This is illustrated in Figure 2 showing the CN of one-
world with and without AA. An exit of AA would drastically reduce the number of 
codeshared airports and routes of oneworld in the US. Due to the loss of international routes 
operated by AA with codesharing by at least another alliance member, the CN of oneworld 
would also become thinner between the US and other parts of the world, for example, across 
the North Atlantic.  
 
 
Fig. 2. CN of oneworld with and without AA. 
The US member airlines are also the largest carriers within each alliance based on available 
seat kilometres (ASKs). However, the size of a carrier’s scheduled operation measured by 
ASKs is not strictly related to the carrier’s importance for the network robustness. For exam-
ple, measured by Dmember for TN, Air Berlin (AB) is more important than British Airways 
(BA) for oneworld. When it comes to the number of operated routes, AB operates 281 routes, 
BA 267 routes. Obviously, comparing just these two numbers can be misleading as they do 
not account for essential capacity parameters such as frequencies and aircraft sizes. However, 
that AB operates 278 of its routes exclusively, i.e., without route overlaps with other one-
world members, while the number of non-shared routes of BA is only 245 partially explains 
the higher Dmember for TN of AB in comparison with BA. Similarly, Dmember values for China 
Eastern (MU) and China Southern Airlines (CZ) for Skyteam’s route network are larger than 
the value for Air France (AF) despite of lower ASKs.   
 
In general, airlines adding additional airport duplicates and route overlaps reduce global air-
line alliance network vulnerability and, hence, strengthen network robustness. For instance, 
scheduled services operated by Aegean Airlines (A3) include slightly less nodes and edges 
than Avianca (AV) but more alliance duplicates and overlaps leading to a higher Dmember of 
A3 in the TN of Star Alliance. However, there is a reversal in the Dmember ranking for the CN 
as the codesharing node and edge ratios of A3 are below the ones of AV. As a result, AV is 
more important for the CN vulnerability of Star Alliance. The opposite Dmember rankings of A3 
and AV despite of similar number of served airports and operated routes exemplify the com-
plexity of analysing global airline alliance networks.  
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Table 4 shows how Star Alliance, SkyTeam and oneworld cover different region groups as 
distinguished in the OAG airline schedules database, Australia and New Zealand belonging to 
the Southwest Pacific (SW) region. A regional network is defined by domestic routes and 
cross-border routes within a given region. Interregional refer to routes between two regions. 
Adding airports and routes across regions leads to the global network (ALL).  
Table 4. Regional and interregional sub-networks of global airline alliances. 
Region 
Star Alliance SkyTeam oneworld 
N E SN % SE % N E SN % SE % N E SN % SE % 
Africa (AF) 135 222 40.0 5.4 64 74 46.9 4.1 38 14 28.9 7.1 
Asia (AS) 289 1,006 41.2 8.7 367 1,548 42.5 17.6 173 285 22.0 3.9 
Europe (EU) 288 1,189 51.4 5.7 206 546 41.3 3.8 225 674 48.4 1.8 
Latin America (LA) 142 233 43.0 5.6 141 206 24.8 1.0 180 247 23.9 1.2 
Middle East (ME) 31 4 61.3 0.0 39 101 33.3 3.0 31 45 61.3 4.4 
North Atlantic (NA) 275 840 21.8 1.5 230 652 11.3 0.0 231 730 12.6 0.3 
Southwest Pacific (SW) 47 83 21.3 0.0 11 2 72.7 0.0 64 110 12.5 1.8 
Interregional  -- 930 -- 7.1 -- 710  -- 6.1  -- 629 -- 6.2 
ALL 1,207 4,507 39.0 5.8  1,058 3,839  33.4 9.0 942 2,734 27.3 2.6 
 
All three alliance networks are thinner in the southern hemisphere than in the northern hemi-
sphere. Star Alliance has a relatively large African network due to its members Ethiopian Air-
lines (ET) and South African Airways (SA). The loss of one of these two carriers would be 
difficult to replace for Star Alliance. The same would be true for Avianca (AV) and Copa 
Airlines (CM) in Latin America, and even more for Air New Zealand (NZ) in the Southwest 
Pacific region.  
 
Dmember values are normalized against the average edge betweenness b(G) of the graph G, i.e., 
the entire network and not the most important airline of a network or of all three networks. 
The average Dmember values for Star Alliance and SkyTeam are smaller than for oneworld be-
cause oneworld has a more balanced membership, i.e., relatively less dominant airlines with 
many routes offered by no other member airline and also fewer small airlines relative to the 
largest airline in the alliance. Furthermore, all else equal the larger the number of member 
airlines the smaller is the average Dmember value of an alliance. Hence, it is not surprising that 
oneworld with the smallest number of members is more vulnerable to member exits than Star 
Alliance and SkyTeam. Similarly, this also contributes to AA’s Dmember being larger than 
UA’s despite AA being smaller than UA when the carrier size is measured by ASKs. 
 
CNs are sub-networks of TNs, but they are also multilayer networks consisting of individual 
airline networks with route overlaps. A removal of route overlaps reduces the structural re-
dundancy of the different layers and a CN becomes more vulnerable. A member airline hav-
ing many route overlaps with other members reduces the overall network vulnerability but 
also increases intra-alliance competition which might lead to negative consequences such as 
lower average fare levels. This is also a crucial issue for airline alliances when selecting new 
members. De Domenico et al. (2015) introduced a method based on quantum theory to identi-
fy redundant layers. An empirical application to unimodal transportation networks having 
functionally similar interaction layers did not substantially reduce the original structure as 
these networks purposely avoid layer redundancy (De Domenico et al., 2015). This in accord-
ance with Lordan et al. (2014a) that member selection of global airline alliances is influenced 
by the route potential, i.e., preferred new partners offer complementary routes not operated by 
an alliance before. 
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Comparing CN with TN leads to variations in the individual carrier Dmember ranking. The CNs 
considered in the present paper consist of scheduled services with at least one codesharing 
agreement giving the weight “1” to all codeshared routes and “0” to all non-codeshared 
routes. In practice, multiple codesharing is quite common. For example, UA operates sched-
uled services between Chicago (ORD) and Los Angeles (LAX) codesharing with five member 
airlines (CA, LH, AC, NH, SK) of Star Alliance but also with non-aligned Aer Lingus (EI). 
Routes with multiple codesharing might be considered more important for an airline alliance 
than routes with single codesharing and, hence, might also get bigger weightings in CNs. 
 
While our paper focuses on the (potential) damage to the CN of a global airline alliance due to 
a member exit, our findings may also contribute to a better risk assessment of the short-term 
impact on a CN if a member airline is temporarily grounded (e.g. the BA shutdown due to a 
major IT systems failure on May 27, 2017) which also implies a decrease in CN coverage. In 
this respect, there is a link with the research of Voltes-Dorta et al. (2017) who measured the 
vulnerability of European air transport to major airport closures. 
 
A member exit removes nonstop services from a global airline alliance network. However, 
our anal-ysis of CN vulnerability is primarily concerned with lost offline connections between 
airlines at connecting points based on codesharing agreements. From the perspective of the 
other alli-ance members, the commercial problem of a member exit is the elimination of of-
fline con-necting services from the CN. This raises the question of the extent to which com-
pensation is possible with other offline connections and also online connections. That an air-
line may be forced to rethink connecting points due to an alliance member exit relates our 
work to research on competition for connecting traffic (e.g. Lieshout et al. (2016), Grosche et 






How to assess the impact of a (potential) exit of a member airline is a critical issue for the 
managing bodies of global airline alliances. We proposed to study the vulnerability of global 
alliance with a graph theory approach based on topological network properties. 
 
Applying the vulnerability measure to the flight schedules of Star Alliance, SkyTeam and 
oneworld shows that oneworld is the most vulnerable global alliance, followed by SkyTeam 
and then Star Alliance. Further, the size of a carrier’s scheduled operation is not strictly relat-
ed to the carrier’s importance for the network robustness. However, the exit of the large US 
carriers United Airlines (UA), Delta Air Lines (DL) and American Airlines (AA) would have 
the biggest impact on of the respective airline grouping as there are many routes offered by 
these American carriers not operated by any other alliance member. In early 2016, Qatar Air-
ways questioned the company's oneworld alliance membership as a consequence of the dis-
pute between US and Gulf carriers over government subsidies. Based on our analysis such a 
move by the carrier would have a limited negative impact on oneworld’s network as Qatar 
Airways has only the seventh largest member share of all 14 members in the overall codeshar-
ing network (CN) vulnerability of this alliance. Similarly, the recent exit of Air Berlin (AB) 
which ceased operations after filing for bankruptcy becomes less relevant for oneworld con-
sidering codesharing routes instead of operated routes. 
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A CN consist of all routes operated by one member airline of a global alliance that also has 
codesharing (i.e. a marketing flight number) by another carrier from the respective alliance. 
Our paper related the findings for CNs with the total network (TN), i.e. the unweighted alli-
ance network of all operated routes. Codesharing as an indicator for route relevance from the 
perspective of partner airlines immediately translates into a basic weighting scheme which 
assigns the weight “1” to all codeshared routes and “0” to all non-codeshared routes. A re-
finement of the weighting scheme considering frequency, seat capacity or distance might be a 
way to further increase the practical meaning of the proposed vulnerability measures. It could 
also be interesting to assess the reverse of a member exit: What happens in terms of reduced 
network vulnerability if a given airline joins an alliance? Future work might investigate the 
optimal robustness of an airline alliance route network, i.e., the trade-off between network 
vulnerability and overlapping networks, which should be of interest to airline managers. Simi-
larly, it might be valuable to combine the proposed vulnerability analysis of airline alliance 
networks in a more comprehensive approach with related concepts such as hubness. The vul-
nerability analysis might also be expanded to consider connecting flights in addition to non-
stop flights which requires a methodology for connection building with parameters such as 
minimum or maximum connecting times. A related problem to measuring vulnerability is how 
to build a robust route network with appropriate partner selection. This paper did not measure 
a new member’s contribution to the robustness of an alliance route network. In practical 
terms, optimization of alliance composition should be assessed with available candidates.     
Appendix A. Alliances and member airlines 
ALL Star Alliance ALL SkyTeam ALL Oneworld 
A3 Aegean Airlines AF Air France AA American Airlines 
AC Air Canada AM Aeromexico AB Air Berlin 
AI Air India AR Aerolineas Argentinas AY Finnair 
AV Avianca AZ Alitalia BA British Airways 
BR EVA Airways CI China Airlines CX Cathay Pacific Airways 
CA Air China CZ China Southern Airlines IB Iberia 
CM Copa Airlines DL Delta Air Lines JL Japan Airlines 
ET Ethiopian Airlines GA Garuda Indonesia LA LATAM Airlines 
JP Adria Airways KE Korean Air MH Malaysia Airlines 
LH Lufthansa German Airlines KL KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines QF Qantas Airways 
LO LOT - Polish Airlines KQ Kenya Airways QR Qatar Airways 
LX Swiss ME Middle East Airlines RJ Royal Jordanian 
MS Egyptair MF Xiamen Airlines Company S7 S7 Airlines 
NH All Nippon Airways MU China Eastern Airlines UL Srilankan Airlines 
NZ Air New Zealand OK Czech Airlines   
O6 Avianca Brazil RO Tarom   
OS Austrian Airlines SU Aeroflot Russian Airlines   
OU Croatia Airlines SV Saudi Arabian Airlines   
OZ Asiana Airlines UX Air Europa   
SA South African Airways VN Vietnam Airlines   
SK SAS Scandinavian Airlines     
SN Brussels Airlines     
SQ Singapore Airlines     
TG Thai Airways International     
TK Turkish Airlines     
TP TAP Portugal     
UA United Airlines     
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